El perjuicio a la vida de relación en la Jurisdicción Ordinaria: Corte Suprema de Justicia
Cardona Montoya, Santiago
Monsalve Cardona, Andrés Felipe
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The sentence of thirteen (13) May, two thousand eight (2008), collapsing the ontological identity, that the Supreme Court assumed to equal the damage to life relationship with the moral damage in the so-called non-pecuniary damage. Autonomy gives subjective moral injury, differentiating it. It should be noted that the generality of the provisions concerning the law of damages the judge granted the possibility of recognizing, of course, in a prudent and rational, new kinds of compensable damages, designed to develop the mentioned principle of full compensation and safeguard the rights of victims, as earnestly as the contemporary law imposes. We therefore have evidence that this failure not only gave autonomy and differentiation of the harm that comprise the so-called non physical, but urged the judges to recognize this new kind of prejudice in favor of the victim and terms comparable to those managed by the Council of State, but may think it is a category that absorbs, exclude or rule out other kinds of damage, because high corporation that leaves the door open for recognition of new kinds of damage, having the scope and different content and referenced: damage to the social life. The state council, for its part took about fifteen (15) years recognized that damage to the date on which it was expandable to the ordinary courts, including the aforementioned injury was replaced three times, in order: physiological damage, life damage relationship and now finally it is called alteration to the conditions. Few months of recognition, set two years that have actually been the case by the court, but the truth is that it still needs the final opinion of the corporation's most important to the ordinary courts that damage to be recognized in some events.